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A	mixed	record:	Assessing	Ukraine’s	domestic
reforms	under	Volodymyr	Zelenskiy
The	so	called	‘Normandy	Four’,	incorporating	the	leaders	of	France,	Germany,	Russia
and	Ukraine,	met	on	9	December	in	Paris	to	discuss	the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine.
Ryhor	Nizhnikau	and	Arkady	Moshes	write	that	alongside	the	conflict	resolution
process,	it	is	also	vital	to	assess	how	Ukraine’s	domestic	situation	has	developed	since
the	election	of	Volodymyr	Zelenskiy	as	President	earlier	this	year.	They	argue	the	record
on	domestic	reform	has	been	mixed	so	far,	with	Zelenskiy	maintaining	the	old	system	of
personalist	governance	and	reliance	on	cadres	instead	of	institutions.
While	most	recent	attention	has	been	drawn	to	the	diplomatic	effort	to	achieve	progress	in	the	conflict	resolution	in
Ukraine’s	Donbas,	which	culminated	in	the	summit	of	the	Normandy	Four	earlier	this	week,	the	process	of	internal
change	in	the	country	has	somewhat	slipped	out	of	focus.	It	might	be	high	time	to	bring	the	issue	back	into	the
limelight.
Ukraine’s	President	Volodymyr	Zelenskiy,	elected	in	April	on	a	wave	of	anti-establishment	sentiment,	popular
demand	for	reforms	and	the	promise	of	a	‘new	era’,	has	been	in	office	for	more	than	half	a	year.	Furthermore,	the
pro-presidential	party,	‘Servant	of	the	People’,	has	enjoyed	a	comfortable	absolute	majority	in	parliament	since
elections	in	July,	enabling	the	President	to	handpick	and	appoint	a	technocratic	government.	Arguably,	the
constellation	of	political	factors	has	been	more	favourable	for	reform	than	ever	before	and	might	only	become	more
complicated	in	future.	This	is	why	drawing	some	initial	conclusions	and	observations	is	appropriate.
The	Normandy	Format	Summit	on	9	December	2019,	Credit:	kremlin.ru
Zelenskiy’s	term	started	promisingly.	Commentators	and	analysts,	including	Vox	Ukraine’s	authoritative	‘iMore
index’,	have	recorded	positive	changes	in	a	number	of	areas.	Yet,	the	current	concentration	of	power,	which
exceeds	the	formal	constitutional	prerogatives	of	the	presidential	office,	combined	with	the	aspiration	to	offer	quick
solutions	and	keep	popular	support,	creates	a	risk	that	systemic	political	and	governance	challenges	will	not	be
addressed	and	certain	checks	on	executive	power	will	be	further	eroded.
These	contradictory	developments	are	especially	apparent	in	the	area	of	the	rule	of	law	and	law	enforcement.	On
the	one	hand,	a	new	prosecution	law	reorganised	the	structures	and	streamlined	competencies	of	the	earlier	highly
toxic	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	(GPO).	The	new	reform-minded	leadership	of	the	GPO	subsequently	announced
drastic	personnel	cuts.	Meanwhile,	the	dysfunctional	and	scandal-prone	State	Bureau	of	Investigations	(SBI)	was
also	rebooted	in	November.
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On	the	other	hand,	the	Ministry	of	Interior	remains	under	full	control	of	a	political	heavyweight,	Arsen	Avakov,	who
has	stayed	in	this	position	since	2014	and	is	reportedly	expanding	his	political	and	economic	interests.	The	State
Security	Service	(SBU)	adamantly	rejects	any	limits	on	its	broad	powers,	such	as	disbanding	the	notorious
“Directorate	K”,	which	is	supposed	to	investigate	economic	crimes	but	is	believed	to	be	involved	in	underhand
activities.	As	a	result,	the	unreformed	SBU,	although	it	is	now	headed	by	the	President’s	old	personal	friend	and
collaborator,	Ivan	Bakanov,	continues	to	repel	potential	investors.	Characteristically,	one	of	the	first	criminal
investigations	the	SBU	opened	under	president	Zelenskiy	was	against	the	major	foreign	investor	ArcelorMittal.	It	is
also	worth	mentioning	that	while	the	new	laws	on	the	GPO	and	SBI	significantly	increase	the	mandate	and	powers
of	heads	of	agencies,	they	also	make	them	more	politically	dependent	on	the	President.
Mixed	results	are	recorded	in	the	fight	against	corruption	as	well.	On	the	positive	side,	the	leadership	of	the	key
anti-corruption	body,	the	National	Agency	on	Corruption	Prevention	(NACP),	has	been	changed	and	its	governance
structure	was	modified	in	line	with	the	demands	of	civil	society.	A	new	law	on	NACP	also	opened	the	income
declarations	of	top	officials	of	the	SBU	and	the	Office	of	the	President	up	to	the	public	while	removing	the
requirement	for	activists	to	declare	assets	and	incomes.	A	law	on	illicit	enrichment,	repealed	by	the	Constitutional
Court	in	February	this	year,	was	adopted	anew.	The	National	Anti-Corruption	Bureau	(NABU)	finally	received	the
right	to	wiretap	its	suspects.	The	mission	of	the	High	Anti-Corruption	Court,	which	started	its	work	in	June	this	year,
was	limited	only	to	cases	of	top-level	corruption.	As	a	result,	hearings	began	on	cases,	which	had	been	blocked	for
a	long	time.
On	the	negative	side,	the	new	authorities	retained	a	highly	controversial	Specialised	Anti-Corruption	Prosecutor
(SAP),	Nazar	Holodnitskiy,	who	was	previously	embroiled	in	some	important	corruption	scandals.	As	before,	judicial
reform	has	so	far	been	used	to	increase	control	over	the	courts	and	fill	key	judicial	positions	with	dubious	figures
and	loyalists.
The	same	ambivalence	is	apparent	in	the	economic	sphere.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Minister	of	Economy,	Timofey
Milovanov,	and	his	team	are	ambitiously	preparing	for	the	launch	of	the	Ukrainian	land	market	and	a	large-scale
privatisation.	The	Ministry	of	Finance	and	National	Bank	are	continuing	with	monetary	reforms	and	so	far,	have
efficiently	resisted	the	return	of	Privatbank,	nationalised	in	2016,	to	its	previous	owners.	The	State	Customs	Service
is	introducing	a	new	electronic	documentation	system,	which	should	help	with	curbing	widespread	corruption.
However,	on	the	other	hand,	the	influence	of	oligarchic	groups	persists.	President	Zelenskiy	has	not	been	able	to
convincingly	show	his	independence	from	such	oligarchs,	who	continue	to	take	over	key	economic	assets.	The
state	energy	regulator,	which	favoured	Rinat	Ahmetov’s	business	group	during	the	presidency	of	Petro	Poroshenko,
now	increasingly	prefers	Igor	Kolomoyskiy,	whose	media	played	an	important	role	in	Zelenskiy’s	campaign.	Even	if
Kolomoyskiy’s	influence	on	Zelenskiy	should	not	be	exaggerated,	the	former	has	recently	received	control	over
Centrenergo,	a	lucrative	energy	generating	company,	and	benefitted	from	new	electricity,	coal	and	oil	schemes.
Much	in	these	contradictory	developments	can	be	explained	through	Zelenskiy’s	own	style	and	previous	business
experience.	Like	his	TV	character	Vasily	Holoborodko,	he	relies	on	personal	and	informal	networks,	sees	a	problem
in	‘wrong’	people	and	not	the	system,	and	prefers	popular	quick	fixes	to	structural	solutions.	Thus,	President
Zelenskiy	continues	the	tradition	of	his	predecessors	of	governing	through	cadres,	appointing	his	friends	and
trustees	to	key	state	positions.
He	and	his	team	widely	apply	informal	mechanisms	to	undermine	formal	institutions.	Numerous	sources
demonstrate	the	vast	informal	influence	of	Andriy	Bohdan,	the	former	corporate	lawyer	of	Igor	Kolomoyskiy	and
currently	the	head	of	the	Office	of	the	President,	over	law	enforcement	and	the	judiciary.	Leaked	records
specifically	show	how	he	gave	orders	on	criminal	investigations	to	the	SBI	Director.	Oligarch	Valeriy	Horoshkovskiy
informally	‘supervises’	customs.	Key	state	policies	(whether	it	is	on	Donbas,	gas	talks	with	Russia	or	Privatbank)
are	formed	non-transparently	and	are	communicated	post	factum.
President	Zelenskiy	has	yet	to	learn	to	act	differently	from	his	predecessors,	to	appreciate	the	role	of	institutions
and	to	listen	to	civil	society,	independent	media	and	the	political	opposition.	If	the	old	system	of	personalist
governance	and	reliance	on	cadres	instead	of	institutions	is	preserved,	the	window	for	destructive	influence	from
inside	and	outside	will	be	kept	wide-open.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: A mixed record: Assessing Ukraine’s domestic reforms under Volodymyr Zelenskiy Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2019-12-12
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/12/a-mixed-record-assessing-ukraines-domestic-reforms-under-volodymyr-zelenskiy/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
_________________________________
About	the	authors
Ryhor	Nizhnikau	–	Finnish	Institute	of	International	Affairs
Ryhor	Nizhnikau	is	a	Senior	Researcher	in	the	EU’s	Eastern	Neighbourhood	and	Russia	programme
at	the	Finnish	Institute	of	International	Affairs.	He	works	on	the	Russian	and	EU’s	policies	towards
Ukraine,	Moldova	and	Belarus	as	well	as	domestic	developments	in	these	countries.	He	received	his
PhD	from	Johan	Skytte	Institute	of	Political	Studies,	University	of	Tartu.	His	recent	publications	include
EU	Induced	Institutional	Change	in	Post-Soviet	Space:	Promoting	Reforms	in	Moldova	and	Ukraine
(Routledge,	2018).
Arkady	Moshes	–	Finnish	Institute	of	International	Affairs
Arkady	Moshes	is	the	Programme	Director	of	the	EU’s	Eastern	Neighbourhood	and	Russia	research
programme	at	the	Finnish	Institute	of	International	Affairs.	From	2008	to	2015	he	was	an	Associate
Fellow	of	the	Russia	and	Eurasia	Programme	at	Chatham	House.	He	received	his	PhD	from	the
Institute	of	Europe,	Russian	Academy	of	Sciences	in	Moscow.	His	main	areas	of	expertise	include
Russia-EU	relations	and	the	internal	and	foreign	policy	of	Ukraine	and	Belarus.	Recently	he	co-edited
What	has	remained	of	the	USSR:	Exploring	the	erosion	of	the	post-Soviet	space	(FIIA,	2019).
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: A mixed record: Assessing Ukraine’s domestic reforms under Volodymyr Zelenskiy Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2019-12-12
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/12/a-mixed-record-assessing-ukraines-domestic-reforms-under-volodymyr-zelenskiy/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
